JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS by Re, Edward D.
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 1 
Issue 1 NEW YORK LAW FORUM, vol 1, 1955 Article 17 
January 1955 
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND 
FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS 
Edward D. Re 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward D. Re, JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS, 1 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (1955). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS
EDWARD D. RE
I. INTRODUCTION
THE remarkable and almost unfathomable technological progress
of recent years may have indirectly caused much that has not changed
in the world to go unnoticed or be relegated to the realm of the un-
important if not complete obscurity. The observation may have par-
ticular merit with reference to all of the blessings of liberty that the
American takes so much for granted. For example, it would almost
seem axiomatic to the American that, since the law of the land for-
bids bills of attainder and the taking of private property, except for
a public use and upon the making of just compensation, confiscation
cases necessarily deal with a confiscatory act of government of a for-
eign country. Hence, by preconception, all confiscation cases are pre-
sumed to be "foreign" cases dealing with principles of international
law and the conflict of laws. Actually, if one were to pause but for
a moment to think about the American Revolution-an event that
unquestionably and unmistakably was destined to change the course
of world history-it would become apparent that the books should be
replete with legal lore on the American laws and judicial decisions of
attainder and the confiscation of property. Although such books
exist,1 they are not as numerous as one might have imagined. Sure-
ly, it is easily understandable that incidents of confiscation or for-
feiture of property are not unknown to American legal history once
it is recalled that such was the usual consequence of an attainder.
2
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1 See VAN TYNE, Tnn LOYALss IN m AmERicAx REVOLUTIOir (New York
1929); FLIcK, LoYAws nrT NEW YoRE DuRINO THE AmumcAn REvoLUTIoN
(New York, 1901); SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN TmE CRITICAL PERIOD 1783-1789
(New York and Oxford, 1932); LAWS oF THE LEGISLATURE o THa STATE or N w
YORK IN FORCE AGAINST Tm LOYALISTS (1786). See also Thompson, Anti-Loyalist
-Legislation in the American Revolution, 3 Ill. L. Rev. 81 (1908).
2 For a thorough treatment of many of these "American" cases of attainder resulting
in a confiscation and forfeiture of property see Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New
York, 23 St. John's L. Rev. 1-67 (1948) and Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New
York, 23 St. John's L. Rev. 243-290 (1949). See the skillful argument of Patrick Henry
before the United States Circuit Court at Richmond, Virginia in 1791, in the case
of Jones v. Walker, where he argued that since British debts were subject to confisca-
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Subsequent to the enactment of the Constitution of the United
States, apart from certain cases following the Civil War,3 the Ameri-
can can be justifiably proud that the problems of confiscation, pre-
sented and litigated in American tribunals, are of foreign origin.
Yet, even in the area of foreign confiscations, and in spite of the tre-
mendous importance and difficulty of the problems presented, books
and monographs systematically treating these questions have appeared
only recently.5 Although many isolated incidents of confiscations can
be found, a body of positive law began to develop and assume content
with the Russian 6 and Mexican7 expropriations. American and Eng-
lish courts were thus more readily enabled to cope with the rather
novel and often perplexing legal problems presented by the Post-
War II nationalizations.8
This entire area of confiscatory legislation, expropriations and
tion in common wars, a fortiori, they were subject to forfeiture in a revolution "com-
menced in attainder, perfidy and confication." SNYDER, ARGUIENTS AnD SPEECHES 1-33
(New York, 1885).
3 See, for example, Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716 (1877) (When
the military forces of the Confederacy were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with
it all its enactments.); Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 48, 4 S. Ct. 283, 28 L. Ed. 348
(1884) (Confiscation proceedings of the insurrectionary Government of the Confeder-
ate States do not protect a party, who, during the war, paid under them, to confed-
erate agents, moneys owing to citizens of loyal states. See also Miller v. United States,
11 Wall. 268, 20 L. Ed. 135 (U. S. 1870); Semmes v. United States, 1 Otto 21 (U. S.
1875); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 (U. S. 1868).
4 In the United States the allegation of "confiscation" is made to test the validity
of a particular law or governmental act. It is a method of raising the constitutional
issue. An example is found in public utility "confiscatory" rate cases. See St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936);
Louisiana Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 79 L. Ed.
1593 (1935); Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas, 2 F. Supp.
792 (D. C. Kansas 1933). See "regulation" cases which in effect compel a shut-down of
business. Oro Fino Consolidated Mines. Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 1016
(1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 948, 71 S. Ct. 1014, 95 L. Ed. 1371 (1951); United
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S. Ct. 670, 95 L. Ed. 809 (1951); Idaho
Maryland Mines Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 576 (Ct. Cl. 1952). See also
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed.
1153 (1952); Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F. 2d 88 (2d Cir. 1953).
5 SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN, INTERNArIoNALEs KON'ISKATioNs-uND ENTERGNUNGSRECHT
(Berlin, 1952); VsrA, LA REsPoNsABILrTA INTERNAZIONALE DELLA STATO PER ATm
LEGISLATIV 121-153 (Milano, 1953); FRIEDiAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONlAL LAW
(London, 1953).
0 See Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American Courts, 34 Yale L. J. 499
(1925).
7 See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 327 (1940); Bul-
lington, Problems of International Law in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 21 Am.
J. Int'l L. 685 (1927).
8 See Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 Col. L.
Rev. 1125 (1948).
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
nationalization decrees was highlighted by the Iranian nationalization
decrees which nationalized the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company 9 Since this exercise of sovereign power dealt with the right
or power of a nation to nationalize foreign-owned property, many
questions of international law had to be reexamined."0 It was evident
that there existed among the nations of the world no unanimity of
view as to the right of a nation to "nationalize" foreign-owned prop-
erty without making just compensation to its owners.11 In addition
to the many policy factors that a nation must consider in making a
determination as to whether it shall nationalize property, the inter-
national legal issue is whether there exists an international standard
of justice, an international due process of law, as it were, which de-
mands that regardless of the treatment afforded the citizens of the na-
tionalizing country, citizens of other nations are entitled to just com-
pensation. This issue presents a real and, as yet, an unsolved problem
because some countries vigorously maintain that in the absence of a spe-
cific treaty to the contrary, foreign nationals are not entitled to a better
standard of treatment than that accorded to their own nationals if the
nationalization decree applies equally to all property owners. 18 Although
this latter view of "equality of treatment" is seriously urged by
9 See Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property in its Impact on Interna-
tional Law, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 709 (1951); Fenwick, The Order of the International
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 723
(1951); Brown, The Juridical Implications of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case,
1952 Wash. L. Q. 384; Maloney, Injunction Without Sanction, 27 Indiana L. J. 333
(1952).
10 See papers submitted by Franz Martin Joseph, Sir Hartley Shawcross, Ignaz
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Michael Brandon and Parvis Kazemi at the Fifth International
Conference of the Legal Profession, Monte Carlo (Monaco) July 19-24 (1954).
11 See discussion of United Nations General Assembly Resolution of December 21,
1952, 23 Dep't of State Bull. 996 (1952); Press Release G. A. 939, United Nations
Department of Public Information, December 1, 1952, pages 8-12; II Foreign Policy
Briefs, Dep't of State, No. 13 (Jan. 16, 1953). See also references in Re, Nationlization
and the Investment of Capital Abroad, 42 Geo. L. J. 44, 48-54 (1953).
12 Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, 6 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 159 (1925);
Anderson, Basis of the Law Against Confiscating Foreign-Owned Property, 21 Am.
J. Int'l L. 525 (1927); Kaeckenbeck, The Protection of Vested Rights in International
Law, 17 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 14 (1936); Hyde, Compensation for Expropriations, 33
Am. J. Int'l L. 108 (1939). For the concept of "vested rights" see ARmwzuNgO, LA
NoTxoN DEs DRoizs ACQuiS E DROIT INTERNATIONAL Piurv (Paris 1934).
13 See BATY, THE CANoNs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (London, 1930); Dunn,
International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 Col. L. Rev. 166 (1928); Williams,
International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 1 (1928). See also
Report of the Ninth International Conference of American States (U.S. Dep't of State
Pub. No. 3263, American Republics Series No. 3, 66-67).
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certain Latin-American countries, the United States has emphatically
and consistently maintained that, regardless of the treatment afforded
nationals, if foreign-owned property is to be appropriated such a tak-
ing is conditioned upon the making of "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive payment."14
A. REVIEW OF AMERICAN DECISIONS AND SCOPE OF PRESENT
ARTICLE.-The inquiries concerning international law, hereinbefore
mentioned, are beyond the scope of the present article. To a certain
extent, they have been treated elsewhere.' 5 Although the purpose is
to treat the recent judicial developments in the field of foreign con-
fiscations, cases decided by foreign municipal tribunals are also out-
side of the scope of the present article. It is necessary to mention
this omission of treatment because important legislation and interest-
ing decisions have been handed down in the Colony of Aden, 6 , Italy,17
Japan,18 Austria19 and Switzerland." The discussion is therefore lim-
ited to the more recent decisions of the American courts. More par-
ticularly, it is proposed to ascertain the extent to which the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and its related principle of non-review have
been applied by the Federal and State courts of the United States.
This latter principle has been stated thus by Mr. Justice Fuller in
the now celebrated case of Underhill v. Hernandez:
2
1
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
'4 Reply to Mexican Position, Dep't of State Press Release No. 398, Aug. 25, 1938;
3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST Or INTERNATioNAL LAW 652 et seq. Washington, 1940-44.
15 Re, The Nationalization of Foreign-owned Property, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 323-342
(1952).
16 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate and others, Supreme Court Colony of
Aden, 1 Weekly Law Reports 246 (Jan. 6, 1953); The Times, Law Report (Jan. 9,
1953). Case is digested in 47 Am. J. Intl L. 325 (1953). See discussion in Bray-
brooke, The Persian Oil Dispute-The Rose Mary Cage, 29 New Zealand L. J. 59, 78,
92 (1953) and Re, Nationalization and the Investment of Capital Abroad, 42 Geo. L. J.
44, 65-66 (1953).
'7 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Societa Unione Petrolifera Orientale da Roma,
Civil Tribunal, Venice, Italy (March 11, 1953) digested in 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 509 (1953);
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Societa etc., Civil Tribunal of Rome, Italy (July 14,
1954), digested in 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 259 (1955).
18 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd. v. Idemitsu Kasan Company, District Court,
Tokyo, Japan (May 27, 1953); N. Y. Times, May 28, 1953, p. 6, col. 6.
19 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austria Restitution Legislation, 2 Am. J. Comp. L.
383 (1953).
20 See Sommerich, Foreign Confiscations and Public Policy, 3 Am. J. Comp. L.
87 (1954).
21 168 U. S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1892).
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sit in judgment on the acts of government of another done within its
own territory."
This principle of judicial non-review, or the "act of state" doc-
trine, or "rule of decision" principle, in its most simple form means
that "the courts of one country are bound to abstain from sitting in
judgment on the acts of another government done within its own ter-
ritory.
' 22
The principle has resulted in sheltering foreign acts of confisca-
tions from the scrutiny of the Anglo-American courts. 23 If the prop-
erty confiscated was in the territory of the confiscating country at
the time of the taking, it has not mattered that the property, at the
time of the litigation, was in the territory of the forum.2 4  The
Supreme Court of the United States has also held that the applica-
bility of the doctrine has not depended on the nationality of the vic-
tim, and hence the principle was applied to a case where the victim
was an American citizen.25
In 1947, in the already celebrated case of Bernstein v. Van Hey-
ghen Freres,2" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied
the principle of non-review to a case involving a spoliation of private
property by the defunct Nazi government. Even if the act of spoli-
ation was illegal by the law of Germany, the question could not be
examined in an American court. The court restated the principle:
"We have repeatedly declared, for over a period of at least thirty
years, that a court of the forum will not undertake to pass upon the
validity under the municipal law of another state purporting to act as
such. We have held that this was a necessary corollary of decisions
of the Supreme Court, and if we have been mistaken, the Supreme
Court must correct it."27
Under the principle, the courts have likewise refused to examine
22 Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, 599 (N. Y. 1876).
23 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); Luther v. Sagor [1921]
1 K. B. 456, rev'd [1921] 3 K. B. 532; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz et al., [1929]
1 K.B. 718.
24 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726
(1918); Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279,
281 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) "... . concededly the acts of a foreign sovereign in expropriating
property within its own territory are not reviewable in our Courts even if the actor
agent or the property later comes within the jurisdiction of the Courts."
25 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62 L. Ed. 733
(1918).
26 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772, 68 S. Ct. 85, 92
L. Ed. 357 (1947).
27 Id. at 249.
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the validity of a foreign expropriation law to determine whether such
law was unconstitutional under the organic law of that country. One
court stated that it did not have "jurisdiction to determine that ques-
tion."
28
The cases declare with unusual clarity that "a seizure by a state
is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the courts.
' 29
After declaring that the court cannot review the acts of the foreign
government, which deprived a plaintiff of his property, some courts
may tender the following gratuitous bit of advice: "The plaintiff is
not remediless. There is a forum and a jurisdiction." 30
The implication, naturally, is that the victim of the confiscation
should sue in the courts of the country that confiscated the property
or that he should seek his redress through diplomatic channels of his
own country. This was indicated in the two companion Supreme
Court of the United States decisions 3' which crystallized the Ameri-
can law on the subject. In the Ricaud case, where an American citi-
zen claimed title to property confiscated by the Mexican government,
the court stated:
"Whatever rights such an American citizen may have can be
asserted only through the courts of Mexico or through the political
departments of our government. 32
28 Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 28 F. Supp. 279, 281
(S. D. N. Y. 1939). In United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 328, 57 S. Ct. 758,
81 L. Ed. 1134 (1937) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted with approval
the language of the Oetjen case to the effect that the conduct of one independent gov-
ernment cannot be questioned in the courts of another. See statement of the Lord
Chancellor in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 2 H. L. Cas. 1, 17, 9 Eng. Rep.
993 (1848) (". . . foreign Sovereign, coming into this country, cannot be made re-
sponsible here for an act done in his sovereign character in his own country; whether
it be an act right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country, or
not, the courts in this country cannot sit in judgment upon an act of a Sovereign. ... ")
In Earn Line v. Sutherland S. S. Co., 254 F. 126, 129 (S. D. N. Y. 1918), aff'd
sub nom., The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (2d Cir. 1920), Judge Learned Hand stated:
"The act of another sovereign within its own territory is of necessity legal. . . . It is
quite true that the act of any public official of a foreign state may in fact be illegal
by the municipal law of that state, but no domestic court may admit such a possi-
bility without trenching upon a prerogative of its own executive. The presupposition
upon which states must deal with each other is that each is responsible for and bound
by the acts of its own functionaries."
29 Mr. Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347,
358, 29 S. Ct. 511, 523, 53 L. Ed. 826, 838 (1909).
30 Stark v. Home Sound Co., 148 Misc. 686, 266 N. Y. Supp. 368, 377 (Sup. Ct.
Chemung Co. 1933).
81 Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U. S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed.
726 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Company, 246 U. S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62
L. Ed. 733 (1918).
32 246 U. S. 304, 310, 38 S. Ct. 312, 314, 62 L. Ed. 733, 737 (1918). See state-
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Since at suit in the courts of the confiscating sovereign is likely
to be an empty right of academic interest only, even assuming that
the sovereign will permit the bringing of the suit in its own courts,
the victim of a confiscation must seek redress through international
diplomacy. The subject, hence, will deal with the prosecution of an
international claim.3" As stated in the leading case of United States
v. Diekelman,4 "a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of
another nation, must seek redress through his own government. His
sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it
need not be considered."
It will be manifest that questions dealing with the law and pro-
cedure of international claims are likewise beyond the purview of this
article. The casual references thereto, together with the summary of
the leading cases, were made for the purpose of offering an orienta-
tion to enable the reader better to evaluate and pursue the course of
the current litigation in this area.
II. THE SPECTER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. NEW UNITED STATES PoIcY.--Because of the close rela-
tionship, in origin and effect, between the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity and the principle of judicial non-review, herein previously
summarized, it should be both interesting and profitable to ascertain
the judicial attitude reflected in the sovereign immunity cases. If one
were to conclude that, following a recent trend, sovereign immunity
exists only as a vanishing shadow, the further inquiry should be made
to learn whether a similar prediction is justified from an analysis of
the cases dealing with the principle of non-review.
In 1948 the Department of State announced that it was recon-
sidering the policy of requesting immunity for foreign government-
merts of Judge Wallace in the United States Court of Appeals opinion in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895). "The citizens of a state have an adequate
redress for any grievance at its hands by an appeal to the courts or the other de-
partments of their own government. Foreign citizens can rely upon the intervention
of their respective governments to redress their wrongs even by resort, if necessary, to
the arbitrament of war."
33 On international claims see 5 HACKWORTr, INTERmATIONA, LAW, 802 et seq.
(Washington, 1940-44); 6 MooRE, INTmNATiONAL LAW, 628 et seq. (Washington, 1906);
Hurst, Nationality of Claims, 1926 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 163.
34 92 U. S. 520, 23 L. Ed. 742 (1876). For the attitude of certain municipal
courts towards some of the international law problems mentioned here, see Mann,
international Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 Law Q. Rev. 181 (1954).
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owned and government-operated vessels.35 On May 19, 1952 the new
United States policy was announced in a letter from the Acting Legal
Adviser of the Department of State to the Acting Attorney General.
The letter referred to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign
immunity and stated:
"... it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of re-
quests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity. '36
This new policy, in effect, embraces the "restrictive" theory of
sovereign immunity. Pursuant to this restrictive view, which origi-
nated in Belgium and Italy, sovereign immunity is recognized only
with respect to those acts characterized as "sovereign" or "public,"
i.e., the jure imperii of a State.37 Contrariwise, sovereign immunity
will not be granted with respect to the "private" acts of a state, i.e.,
jure gestionis. For a helpful demarcation as to what acts are tradi-
tionally regarded as "sovereign" or "public" as distinguished from
those treated as "private" one may refer to the Draft Convention on
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States. Article II pro-
vides:
"A State may be made the respondent in a proceeding in a court
of another State, when in the territory of such other State, it engages
in an industrial, commercial, financial or other business enterprise in
which private persons may there engage, or does an act there in con-
nection with such an enterprise wherever conducted, and the proceed-
ing is based upon the conduct of such enterprise or upon such act."
The new policy enunciated by the Department of State is in
harmony with the existing practice of international law which denies
the plea of sovereign immunity in relation to the commercial enter-
prises of a State.3 In reading the letter of the Acting Legal Adviser,
it is significant to note that special reference was made to the fact
that the "widespread and increasing practice on the part of govern-
35 The New York Times, April 10, 1948, p. 29, col. 3.
36 26 Dep't of State Bull. 984, 985 (1952).
37 See 2 HACxwORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 463 (Washington, 1940-44); Bishop,
New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 93,
96 (1953).
38 See Brinton, Suits Against Foreign States, 25 Am. J. Int'l L. 50 (1931); Fen-
sterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1950).
Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises:
A Proposed Solution, 27 Mich L. Rev. 751 (1929). Shepard, Sovereignty and State-
Owned Commercial Enterprises (New York, 1951).
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ments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice
which will enable persons doing busiess with them to have their rights
determined in the courts." 9 It would follow from this statement that,
in accordance with the view recently adopted, claims against foreign
governments in relation to their commercial activities should be prose-
cuted in the courts and should no longer be prosecuted through dip-
lomatic channels as international claims. To this extent one can sense
the exhortation of the political department of government urging the
courts to assume jurisdiction in an area where they have traditionally
abstained. 0 The Acting Legal Adviser stated the thought as follows:
"It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot con-
trol the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow
a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to
do so. )41
Actually, there was no doubt that the new State Department
announcement would have had a pronounced effect upon the judicial
thinking on the subject of sovereign immunity. Since the Supreme
Court has treated the question of sovereign immunity as a matter
of foreign policy to be determined by the executive," Professor
Bishop correctly pointed out that the courts "pay great attention in
this field to the views of the Executive. ' 43 The great extent of the
possible influence of this new executive policy will not become ap-
parent until one examines the case of National City Bank v. Republic
of China,44 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in
1955. Before discussing this momentous decision, it would seem fruit-
ful to treat, however briefly, the interesting English judicial trend in
this area.
B. RECENT ENGLISH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAsEs.-Since, in
the decision of cases involving great issues of international law and
diplomacy, an American court may often cast its eye upon the ju-
39 26 Dep't of State Bull. 984, 985 (1952) (emphasis added).
40 See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its Functions?, 40 Am.
J. Int'l L. 168 (1946).
41 26 Dep't of State Bull. 984, 985 (1952).
42 See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 35, 41-42, 89 L. Ed. 729,
735, 738 (1945).
43 Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J.
Intl L. 93, 101 (1953).
44 75 Sup. Ct. 423, 99 L. Ed. 504 (1955).
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dicial trends in England, 5 it seems necessary to refer to the case of
Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Government of Indonesia46 recently de-
cided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There was no
question in this case that Juan Ysmael & Co., in 1950, was the owner
of the S.S. Tasikmalaja. In 1951 it chartered the vessel to the Indo-
nesian Government by the first of a series of charters which expired
on June 30, 1952. In February 1952 the Indonesian Government
purported to purchase the vessel from an agent of its owner, even
though the government knew that the agent had no such power. On
the orders of the government the vessel was brought into Hong Kong
for repairs. On the 27th of June 1952 the plaintiffs issued a writ in
rem against the vessel. The Indonesian Government entered a condi-
tional appearance and, alleging that it was the owner or was in pos-
session or control or entitled to the possession of the vessel, moved
for an order that the writ be set aside on the ground that it impleaded
a foreign sovereign State. As it was clear that at the time when the im-
munity was claimed the Indonesian Government had no title to the ves-
sel, since the purported purchase was void, it was evident that its claim
of title was at best a "bare" or a "mere" claim. The Privy Council,
therefore, reversed the lower court and held that, since respondents
could not assert possession of the vessel, the respondents' claim of
immunity, based upon a manifestly defective title, was insufficient
to justify the claim to immunity.
The Juan Ysrnael case decides a question up to this time mooted
in the law of England concerning the applicability of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Under the doctrine, a foreign government
may not be impleaded in the English courts unless it grants its ex-
press consent. The English law has been settled that the immunity
applies to any case where the decision of the court would affect either
the proprietary or possessory right of such government to the prop-
erty that is the subject matter of the litigation. Where the title of
the government is conceded there is no problem. Although some
45 See footnote 7 of the Supreme Court of the United States in National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 75 Sup. Ct. 423, 99 L. Ed. 504 (195). "The Privy Coun-
cil recently rejected the view of Lord Justice Scrutton in the Jupiter (Eng.) [1924]
Prob. 236-CA, that the mere assertion of a claim by a foreign government to prop-
erty the subject of an action by a private party compels the court to stay the action
and decline jurisdiction." Juan Ysmael & Co. v. Indonesia (Eng.) [1954] 3 Week. L.
Rev. 531.
46 [1935 A. C. 72; [1954] 3 W. L. R. 531. Digested in 49 Am. J. Intl L. 257-
259 (1955).
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questions have been raised, it may also be considered clear that even
in those cases where the government does not assert title but proves
its possession and control, sovereign immunity is likewise applica-
ble.47 The question that needed to be answered dealt with a situation
where the claim of sovereign immunity is resisted by a litigant who
disputes both the title and the possession and control of the foreign
government in relation to the property. Here, the litigant has placed
in issue the basis upon which the foreign government relies for its
assertion of immunity. The simple question, therefore, is whether the
claim of immunity should be permitted to stand where the foreign
government does no more than assert a claim of ownership or pos-
session.
If the doctrine of- sovereign immunity were to be preserved in its
absolute and regal dignity of yesteryear, it would seem that the
answer to this question should be in the affirmative. For this answer
there is definite support in the case of The Jupiter," even though
doubt would be cast upon it by a reading of the opinions of Lord
Wright and Lord Maughan in the case of The Cristina.0
The case of Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Government of Indo-
nesia'° is extremely important because it clearly widens the crevices
in the ancient wall of sovereign immunity. In England it also re-
solves whatever doubt may have existed as to the merit of the views
expressed by Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., of the Court of Appeal in the
case of Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd.,"' decided shortly
after the case of The Cristina.52 In the Haile Selassie case, the de-
fendant stated that the Italian Government, which was not a party to
the action, claimed to be the owner of the debt which the plaintiff
sued to recover. This assertion on behalf of the Italian Government
was held to be insufficient by the Court of Appeal that reversed the
decision of the lower court. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., writing for
the Court of Appeal, said:
"... where the property which is not proved or admitted to be-
long to, or be in the possession of a foreign sovereign or his agent
is in the possession of a third party, and the plaintiff claims it from
47 The Cristina [1938] A. C. 485.
48 The Jupiter (No. 3) [1927] A. C. 122, 138; [1924] A. C. 236, 244.
49 The Cristina [1938] A. C. 485.
50 Note 46 supra.
51 [1938] Ch. 839.
52 Note 49 supra.
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that third party, and the issue in the action is whether the property
belongs to the plaintiff or to the foreign sovereign, the very question
to be decided is one which is required to be answered in favour of the
sovereign's title before it can be asserted that that title is being ques-
tioned.... So far as principle is concerned, the present action does
not seek to bring His Majesty the King of Italy before the court,
nor does it seek to interfere with any proved or admitted proprietary
or possessory right belonging to him. '5 3
There is no doubt that under the Haile Selassie case the defend-
ant's assertions of ownership of a res on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment was futile, and if such foreign government wished to protect
such ownership, if it in fact existed, it had to come before the court
and prove the fact of ownership like any other litigant.
The observation could be made that since the Italian Govern-
ment was not a party to the action in the Haile Selassie case, any
pronouncement as to what it would have to do in order to assert a
claim of immunity if it had been a party is mere dictum. The result-
ing uncertainty is removed by the Juan Ysmael case where the Gov-
ernment of Indonesia was actually a party. Its holding," therefore,
6annot be questioned that a mere claim of immunity by a foreign sov-
ereign based upon a "manifestly defective" title is insufficient. The
court is to be satisfied upon the threshhold question that the claim
of ownership is not manifestly illusory or defective. An unsupported
claim of immunity is no longer to be deemed sufficient or conclu-
sive. 5 In the words of Earl Jowitt, such a view today would lead
to "a very grave injustice.
5 6
It should be pointed out, however, that the Juan Ysmael decision
does not represent a complete swing of the pendulum. Where the
title or claim of immunity is not manifestly defective, the claim of
immunity is to be sustained. Hence, it would seem that a prima facie
showing or proof of ownership would still be sufficient. This, of
course, implies something more than a mere demand for immunity.
It is in harmony with the "American doctrine" under which the claim
53 fHaile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd. [1938] Ch. 839, 844 (emphasis added).
54 "... although judgments of the Privy Council are not, strictly speaking, bind-
ing on other courts in England, they enjoy the greatest authority. . . ." E. Lauterpacht,
International Law-Sovereign Immunity, The Cambridge Law J. 19, 22 (April 1955).
55 See The Jupiter [1924] A. C. 236 (by Scrutton L.J.).
56 Judgment of the Judicial Committee in Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Indonesian
Government [1954] 3 W. L. R. 531.
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of immunity must be supported by something more than a mere
assertion of it.
57
In view of recent developments, designed to withhold the grant-
ing of sovereign immunity in connection with the commercial activi-
ties of a foreign country,58 another observation of the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council is worthy of special mention. Since the
vessel in question was being used as a troop carrier, an act of State
clearly "public" or "sovereign'--jure imperii-it was noted that "the
question raised in some of the cases whether a right of immunity can
be claimed for a ship used by the foreign government solely for com-
mercial purposes does not arise."59
For those who wish to see a complete repudiation of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the Juan Ysmael case does not go far enough.
It has been submitted that a prima facie showing of entitlement to
the claim of immunity should not be sufficient. In the "impleader"
cases, it is said to "introduce into the law of State immunity as ap-
plied in England a method whereby an unscrupulous, negligent or
inefficient foreign administration may, without good reason, impede
the determination by English courts of title to property situated with-
in their jurisdiction."6 It should be remembered, however, that pre-
cisely this result follows in the cases where the principle of judicial
non-review of the acts of a foreign government is deemed to apply.
In many of the confiscation cases, where the res at the time of the
litigation was before the court of the forum, the court was nonethe-
less prevented from reviewing the foreign act of government."' The
5 Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. 2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1938). For this statement the
Court cited, among others, the cases of The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216,41 S. Ct., 308, 65 L. Ed.
592 (1921), and The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909 (4th Cir. 1916). See discussion in Zarine
v. Owners, etc., S. S. Ramava, etc., LXXV Irish Law Times Reports 153 (1941) di-
gested in 36 Am. J. Int'l L. 490 (1942). See also Cardozo, Sovereign Intnmunity:
The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 608 (1954).
58 In the Porto Alexandre [19201 30, 38-39, Lord Justice Scrutton stated in dic-
tum: "No one can shut his eyes, now that the fashion of nationalization is in the air,
to the fact that many states are trading or are about to trade, with ships belonging
to themselves; and if these national ships wander about without liabilities, many trad-
ing affairs will become difficult."
59 Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Government of Indonesia, [19541 3 W. L. R. 531.
See also decision of the Eire High Court in Zarine v. Owners, etc. S. S. Ramava etc.,
LXXV Irish Law Times Reports 153 (1941), wherein it was stated that the immunity
for State vessels does not apply to vessels used for private trading purposes, but only
to such vessels as are publicis vsibus destinata.
60 Note 54 supea at 22.
61 For example, see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 309,
62 L. Ed. 726 (1918).
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crucial inquiry in these cases deals with the situs of the res at the
time that the foreign government undertook to affect its ownership or
possession. Although an act of government seizing private property
within the territorial jurisdiction of such state will not be reviewed
in the Anglo-American courts, no extraterritorial effect will be given
to an attempted confiscation of a res beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the confiscating sovereign.62 The few situations where an
extraterritorial effect was granted are explained by the very special
and peculiar circumstances surrounding the operative facts of those
decisions .
3
The English case of Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Government of
Indonesia" cannot at all be regarded as a retrogression in the develop-
ment of sovereign immunity."5 On the contrary, it continues the judi-
cial trend to restrict the applicability of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.6  Surely, it should be obvious to legal scholars on both
sides of the Atlantic that revolutionary changes of position concern-
ing doctrines that have existed for centuries cannot be expected over-
night. The English process of judicial evolution in the area of sov-
ereign immunity is sufficiently clear and points unalterably in the di-
rection of a restriction of the traditional doctrine. One is reminded,
however, that nothing that has been decided or stated in any of the
English decisions indicates that actual possession of a vessel by a
62 See Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] 1 K. B. 140;
Plesch et al. v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 298 N. Y. 573, 81 N. E.
2d 106 (1948). See Kuerschner etc. v. New York Trust Co., 126 F. Supp. 684, 689
(S. D. N. Y. 1954) wherein the court stated that it "would wish to protect the
rights of innocent stockholders affected by confiscatory decrees in foreign countries,
inasmuch as our courts do not recognize those acts when they purport to affect prop-
erty not within the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign government, unless a na-
tional policy of the United States Government requires that such extra-territorial effect
should be given." In this case the court suggested that the plaintiffs might well utilize
the procedure provided in Section 977-b of the New York Civil Practice Act. See
notes 161, 162, 165 infra.
63 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942) (Lit-
vinoff assignment); Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. 2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938) (Mexican Con-
sul on behalf of Republic of Mexico "took possession" of a Mexican vessel in Mobile,
Alabama). See also cases of "protective" expropriations by "friendly" foreign sover-
eigns such as Fields v. Predionica, I Tkanica A.D., 265 App. Div. 132, 37 N. Y. S. 2d
874 (1st Dep't 1942); Anderson v. N. V. Transadine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N. Y. 9,
43 N. E. 2d 502 (1942). These cases are discussed in RE, FoREIGN Co~nscATioxs jz
A. TGo-A.w. EucA LAw, 42-50, 97-104, 117-127 (New York, 1951).
64 Note 46 supra.
65 Cf. E. Lauterpacht, International Law-Sovereign Immunity, The Cambridge
Law J. 19, 23 (April 1955).
66 See also Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar [1952] A. C. 318.
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foreign government would not be enough to sustain the applicability
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Both in England 7 and in the
United States 8 actual possession is deemed sufficient without proof
of ownership.
C. "GENEROSITY TO PARSIM ONY" IN GRANTING SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY.-The most important recent decision in the area of sov-
ereign immunity is unquestionably National City Bank of New York
v. Republic of China 9 decided in 1955 by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Shanghai-Nanking Railway, an official agency
of the Nationalist Government of China, brought suit in the United
States District Court to recover a certain deposit with the defendant
bank. The latter interposed two counterclaims and sought an affirma-
tive judgment against the Republic of China on its defaulted Treas-
ury Notes held by the bank. After a plea of sovereign immunity, the
District Court dismissed the counterclaims.70 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed on the ground that the counterclaims
were not based on the subject matter of the suit brought by the Re-
public of China. Whether the counterclaims be treated as requests for
affirmative relief or setoffs, since they were not based on the subject
matter of the suit, the Court of Appeals held that to have allowed
them would have been an invasion of sovereign immunity.71 Since the
defendant admitted that the Republic of China was a sovereign gov-
ernment,_ recognized as such by the United States, the assertion
against such a government of an unrelated claim "is the equivalent of
an independent suit against that sovereign brought without its con-
sent.' 7 The defendant, before the Court of Appeals, referred to the
May 19, 1952 letter indicating the "shift of policy" of the Depart-
ment of State. Although it did not argue that the new policy, if
adopted by the courts, would deprive plaintiff of its sovereign im-
munity, the defendant's position seemed to be that the "new trend
67 The Cristina, [1938] A. C. 485.
68 The Janko (The Morsktank), 54 F. Supp. 240 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); Ervin v.
Quintanilia, 99 F. 2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1938). See also The Navemar, 90 F. 2d 673
(2d Cir. 1937) (For purposes of immunity from suit "constructive possession" is as
efficacious as actual possession).
69 348 U. S. 356, 75 Sup. Ct. 423 (1955).
70 108 F. Supp. 766 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
71 208 F. 2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953). Case is tersely digested in 48 Am. J. Int'l L.
332 (1954).
72 Id. at 629.
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indicated in this letter should be further extended judicially so as to
validate the counterclaims in the instant case.1 73 Judge Frank, who
wrote the opinion of the Court of Appeals, concluded:
"We have no high regard for the idea that, without its consent,-
a government may not be sued for acts which, if done by a private
person, would be actionable wrongs. . . But we feel that we must
leave to Congress or the Supreme Court any marked diminution of
that hoary doctrine (although in the beliefs of many persons, it is
basically immoral)." 7
Perhaps heeding the none too subtle suggestion found in the
Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, and directed the District Court to reinstate the counter-
claim. The holding of the majority75 is sharp and precise: a foreign
sovereign that sues in our courts is not immune from a counterclaim
limited to reducing the recovery of the sovereign, even though the
counterclaim is neither based upon the subject matter of the suit nor
does it arise out of the same transaction.
In spite of the "impressive title-deeds" of sovereign immunity,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, referred to the
"chilly feeling against sovereign immunity" which began to reflect
itself in federal legislation as early as 1797, and stated:
"The claims of dominant opinion rooted in sentiments of justice
and public morality are among the most powerful shaping-forces in
lawmaking by courts. Legislation and adjudication are interacting
influences in the development of law. A steady legislative trend, pre-
sumably manifesting a strong social policy, properly makes demands
on the judicial process."7
With a firm grasp upon a legislative pen, the learned Justice,
after noting that the more relevant evolution of the legal doctrines
regarding a foreign sovereign's immunity is the new restrictive policy
of the Department of State, proceeded to examine the justice of a
foreign sovereign who has invoked our law but resists "a claim
against it which fairly would curtail its recovery."7
73 Id. at 630.
74 Ibid.
75 Justices Reed, Clark and Burton dissented. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part
in the case.
76 Id. at 426.
77 Id. at 427.
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The assertion of the respondent-sovereign, urging that the coun-
terclaim was based upon a fiscal matter within the immune category
of even the 1952 State Department pronouncement, was summarily
brushed aside. "This is not to be denied, but it is beside the point,"
said the Court. To the Court three factors seemed overwhelming:
First, the foreign sovereign voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of our
courts; secondly, the State Department had not intimated that the
allowance of the counterclaims would embarrass friendly relations
with the Republic of China; and, thirdly, since a setoff, based upon
the subject matter of a sovereign's suit, "is allowed to cut into the
doctrine of immunity," the doctrine is clearly not absolute. All this
led to the conclusion that "considerations of fair play must be taken
into account in its application."78s As for the limitation that a setoff
or counterclaim be limited to the subject matter of the action, the
Court considered such a test to be too indeterminate and capricious.
The court, consequently, specifically held that "the ultimate thrust
of the consideration of fair dealing which allows a setoff or counter-
claim based on the same subject matter reaches the present situa-
tion."
79
Surely no well-established doctrine could go down in such igno-
minious defeat without a voice of dissent. Mr. Justice Reed, with
whom Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Clark joined, dissented in
opinion. The situation was equally clear to the dissenters. First,
sovereign immunity does not create a situation of irresponsibility since
satisfaction may be had through the legislative organ which recog-
nizes the moral obligation and pays creditors and those injured.
Secondly, a "sovereign's freedom from judicial control does not arise
from or depend upon the will of the courts."80 Mr. Justice Reed quot-
ed from The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon8' that such freedom
depends on "the will of the sovereign of the territory." The sovereign-
ty of the Republic of China was not questioned, and, since the bank's
counterclaims rested on Treasury Notes of the Republic of China,
the counterclaims were based on "sovereign obligations, jure imperil,"
"Consequently, the attitude of the Department of State as to the de-
sirability of relaxing the strict rule of immunity as to acts of com-
78 Id. at 429.
79 Ibid.
80 Id. at 430.
81 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812).
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merce, jure gestionis, is inapplicable." 2 The dissenting opinion could
see no justification to the decision of the majority in the absence of
legislative or executive action or authority. 8
Mr. Justice Reed expressed with forceful eloquence the reasons
why he would "leave the question of jurisdictional immunity of for-
eign sovereigns to the other branches."
"International relations are preeminently a matter of public poli-
cy. Judicial views of supposed public interests are not the touch-
stone whereby to determine the law. The change from a generous to
a parsimonious application of the principle of sovereign immunity
should come from Congress or the Executive. Our courts possess
great powers and have solemn obligations. Our country allots power
to the judiciary in the confidence that, in view of the separation of
powers, judicial authority will not undertake determinations which
are the primary concern of other branches of our Government. Dif-
ferences of view exist as to the desirable scope of sovereign immunity
and the necessity for nonjudicial determinations. But surely it is
better that the decisions be left to those organs of Government that
have the responsibility for determining public policy in carrying out
foreign affairs. The establishment of political or economic policies is
not for the courts. Such action would be an abuse of judicial
power.")
8 4
Regardless of one's wish to witness the complete crumbling of
the wall of sovereign immunity, 5 it is difficult dispassionately to re-
fute certain observations made in the dissenting opinion. It cannot
be easily denied, as stated by the dissent, that deposits may, be the
"life blood necessary for national existence." The warning is sound-
ed that:
"It is not wise for us to tell the nations of the world that any
assets they may have in the United States, now or in the future, upon
which suit must be brought, are subject to every counterclaim their
debtors can acquire against them at par or at a discount."80
82 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 365, 75 S. Ct. 423, 431
(1955).
83 "Affirmative legislative action was necessary to allow such a limited setoff
against the United States. Action of a similar nature should be required to authorize
this setoff." Dissent in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 366, 75
S. Ct. 423, 432 (1955).
84 Ibid.
85 See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,
28 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 220 (1951); Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 Va. L. Rev.
349 (1925) ; Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 La. L.
Rev. 476 (1953).
86 Note 83 supra at 433.
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The dissent concludes that the majority has allowed a "cir-
cuitous evasion of the well-established rule prohibiting direct suits
against foreign sovereigns."8' 7 It did not ignore the question of fair-
ness or self-interest:
"It is unfair to our foreign friends and detrimental to our own
financial and mercantile interests. For fairness we need not go be-
yond the allowance of counterclaims arising out of transactions for-
eign sovereigns seek to enforce in our courts." 8
Although it cannot be said that with the decision of National
City Bank v. Republic of China the structure of sovereign immunity
has completely crumbled, it can be said that its foundations have been
irreparably weakened. To allow any counterclaim, even up to the
amount of the sovereign's suit, is a serious inroad upon the doctrine
as it has been formerly applied. Surely, the District Court and Court
of Appeals decisions were correct in the light of precedent. It was
the Supreme Court that boldly struck a telling blow to the foreign
sovereign who invokes the jurisdiction of our courts. Of course, if
the present holding is sought to be abused by a defendant who, in
bad faith, purchases claims against a plaintiff foreign government,
the court might evaluate the requirements of fairness in the particu-
lar case and not allow the unrelated counterclaims to be interposed.
The burden and responsibility of the courts hereafter in this respect
will be great. It is nonetheless true that "the urge to grant sovereign
immunity has . . . lost much of its force."819 Since this judicial atti-
tude evidences a willingness to assume a judicial responsibility in an
area formerly only too often shifted to the "political department" of
government, it becomes increasingly more interesting to ascertain
whether the same attitude is noticeable in those cases where the courts
have traditionally abstained from passing upon an act of a foreign
government done within its territory. 0
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Cardozo, International Law in the New York Courts-1953, 40 Cornell L. Rev.
97, 109 (1954). Of course, questions continue to arise whether a particular defendant
is entitled to diplomatic immunity. In one case, the defendant claimed immunity as a
member of the delegation of the Italian observer at the United Nations. Plaintiff pre-
sented a statement of the Department of State that such persons are not entitled to
immunity from suit. The court, consequently, denied the claim of immunity. Pappas
v. Francisci, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1953).
90 See discussion of Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., note
103 iira.
[VOL. I
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
D. "FRIENDLINESS" or FOREIGN SovEREIGN.-Other cases illus-
trate the extent to which the American courts rely upon the infor-
mation and advice of the State Department in the sovereign immunity
area. Of such cases the most interesting one is Hungarian People's
Republic v. Cecil Associates, Inc. 1 The plaintiff sued its landlord for
the return of the security deposit that it had given under a lease of
premises that it had used for consular purposes. The United States,
for political reasons, had ordered the plaintiff to close its consulate,
and since the plaintiff did not pay rental falling due thereafter, the
defendant lessor counterclaimed for unpaid rent and damages in
excess of the amount for which the plaintiff sued. The plaintiff moved
to dismiss the counterclaims on the ground that they failed to state
claims upon which relief could be granted "in that they seek affirma-
tive judgment against an immune sovereign, which has not consented
to the entry thereof."9
The District Court thereupon inquired of the Secretary of State
whether plaintiff was a "friendly foreign government" and as such
would be immune from suit. The reply stated that the United States
Government recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with
plaintiff; however, since plaintiff had not, as was the custom, claimed
immunity to the Department of State, the Department did not recog-
nize or allow such claim. Nevertheless, the court stated:
"The recognition of the Hungarian People's Republic by the gov-
ernment of the United States and the maintenance of diplomatic rela-
tions between them, however strained, accords to the Hungarian
People's Republic the right to appear in the suit and to raise the
jurisdictional question."93
The court held that, having invoked the process of the court, the
plaintiff "cannot be heard to plead immunity against the granting to
the defendants by way of set-off, of relief at least to the extent to
which the plaintiff seeks affirmative judgment."9 4
The defendant maintained that, by submitting itself to the juris-
diction of the court, it suffered a total loss of immunity. Despite our
diplomatic relations with plaintiff, based upon the letter which or-
dered the closing of plaintiff's consulate, it was maintained that plain-
91 118 F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y. 1953).
92 Id. at 956.
93 Id. at 957.
94 Ibid.
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tiff was not a "friendly foreign sovereign." The court's reply was
simple and direct:
"This contention must be rejected for the 'friendliness' of a for-
eign sovereign, with whom diplomatic relations are maintained, is a
subject for political and not judicial determination." 5
It has been 'asked why after having taken the "trouble to ascer-
tain the view of the political branch of the government," the court
"did not go further and accept their hint that immunity in this case
was not needed in the interest of good relations between the coun-
tries."0 6 As to any "hint" of unfriendliness, it must be observed that
even if the foreign sovereign did not enjoy diplomatic recognition, it
still would not have been suable in our courts . 7 Furthermore, much
clearer "hints" have existed in the past,18 but in matters of "inter-
national cognizance""9 the courts have required a "definitive expres-
sion of Executive policy"'100 particularly if they are to overturn an en-
trenched doctrine. Such a prerogative, as has been observed from the
case history of National City Bank v. Republic of China,101 seem-
ingly, is only exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States.
A word can be added in support of Judge Sugarman of the
United States District Court, who decided the case of Hungarian
People's Republic v. Cecil Associates. Delicate problems of diplomacy
are involved in any situation where the issue is the friendliness of an
existing government. This does not mean that a firm foreign policy
is not to be followed when dealing with certain countries, but it does
95 Id. at 958.
96 Cardozo, International Law in the New York Courts-1953, 40 Cornell L. Q.
97, 108 (1954).
97 See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372,
138 N. E. 24 (1923); Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150, 142
N. E. 569 (1923). ("So long as it [defendant] maintained an independent existence, it
was immune from suit for its governmental acts in our courts without its consent.
Lack of recognition by the United States Government, we have recently held, does
not permit an individual suitor to bring a de facto government before the bar.")
98 See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir.
1947), which involved an act of spoliation of the defunct Nazi Government whose
leaders were tried as war criminals.
99 Id. at 251, opinion of L. Hand, J.
100 "In the prior appeal in this case . . . because of the lack of a definitive ex-
pression of Executive policy, we felt constrained to follow the decision of this court
in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres . . . , by ordering the plaintiff to refrain from
alleging matters which would cause the court to pass on the validity of acts of
officials of the German government." Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche,
etc., 210 F. 2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
101 Note 69 supra.
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mean that the extent, nature and forcefulness of our disapproval of
a foreign government and its policies is a matter to be determined
by the appropriate governmental department specifically charged with
such duties. Particularly when relations with a foreign country are
strained, the Executive, usually through the Department of State,
must determine the appropriate measures to be adopted. If, in order
to effectuate the foreign policy determined by that organ of our gov-
ernment toward a particular country, the cooperation of the courts
is either desired or necessary, such a policy should be perspicuously
expressed and should not leave the court in doubt.
III. THE ENDURING PRINCIPLE OF ABSTENTION
A. INDUCING FOREIGN SOVEREIGN To BREACH CONTRACT.-In
spite of the ultimate private settlement of the litigation, the Bernstein
cases 10 2 nevertheless represent the most significant development in the
evolution of the principle that the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of government of another. Before tracing
this development, however, several other cases will be stated that also
indicate the persistence of the principle.
The most interesting of these cases is Frazier v. Foreign Bond-
holders Protective Council, Inc. °3 wherein the plaintiffs, former owners
of Peruvian bonds, sued the defendants for their alleged tortious con-
duct in inducing Peru to breach its contract with plaintiffs in not
honoring the bonds according to their original terms. In a prior ac-
tion, plaintiffs sued the Hanover Bank,"0 4 to compel the bank to dis-
tribute certain scrip certificates. In view of the fact that the certifi-
cates were the property of Peru, and since the bank was acting solely
as an agent of Peru, the motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint was
granted because to grant the relief sought necessarily involved adju-
dicating a claim against a foreign sovereign. In the present action,
plaintiffs charge the defendants with having "conspired and willfully
102 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U. S. 772, 68 S. Ct. 88, 92 L. Ed. 357 (1947); Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche, etc., 76 F. Supp. 335 (S. D. N. Y. 1948), aff'd in part, modified in part, 173
F. 2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949); Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 117 F. Supp.
898 (S. D. N. Y. 1953); Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 210 F. 2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954).
103 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (1st Dep't 1953).
104 Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 319 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
Co. 1953), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 918 (1st Dep't 1953).
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induced" Peru to breach its contract by issuing newly authorized scrip
certificates to the holders of new bonds instead of the class of holders
such as plaintiffs, all pursuant to a Peruvian statute. The defendants
do not plead sovereign immunity, as was done by the Hanover Bank
in the prior action, but assert that "plaintiffs' claim requires the court
to sit in judgment on the decisions of a foreign government made in
the exercise of its sovereign power and would necessarily require an
adjudication as to whether Peru had reached a valid and existing con-
tract with the plaintiffs."'1 5 Although Peru was not a party, and no
relief was sought against it, the defendants insisted that plaintiffs'
cause of action could not be heard without passing on the validity
of an act of government of Peru. Special Term of the Supreme Court,
holding that the "action in no wise involves sovereign immunity or
the foreign government in any binding adjudication," granted plain-
tiffs' motion to strike out the defenses. In reversing Special Term,
the Appellate Division said:
"But the immunity of a foreign sovereign, in all its implications,
is not restricted to warding off only those assaults aimed directly at
that sovereign as a party proper."
06
The court referred to the judicial "deference to the historic prin-
ciple" of sovereign immunity and added:
"It is a doctrine born of expediency, nourished in the council hall
of nations as well as the courts of justice. Its dominant motif is
political. It has gained stature in the world of international diploma-
cy and politics, where an 'incident' involving the dignity of nations
is measured by its explosive potential as well as its legal implica-
tions."M
0 7
The court, quoting from the Oetjen case, 08 and citing the
familiar "act of state" or related cases, 10 concluded:
".... when a foreign government is recognized by our State De-
partment, our courts will not sit in judgment on the validity of acts
105 283 App. Div. 44, 46, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 900, 902 (1st Dep't 1953).
106 Id. at 47, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 903.
107 Ibid.
108 246 U. S. 297, 302, 38 S. Ct. 309, 311, 62 L. Ed. 726, 732 (1918).
109 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62 L. Ed. 733 (1918);
Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 F. 367 (2d Cir. 1918); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947); Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362,
24 N. E. 2d 81 (1939); Telkes v. Hungarian N'at1 Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38
N. Y. S. 2d 419 (1st Dep't 1942).
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done by that government within its own territory. This general rule
holds true whether the foreign government is sued directly or through
an agent, or whether its actions are questioned collaterally in litiga-
tion between private citizens.""
n0
In the Frazier case, plaintiffs correctly characterized the defenses
as "an attempt to immunize a private citizen for wrongdoing to an-
other private citizen.""' Such immunity resulted from the court's
abstention from passing upon the issue of Peru's repudiation of its
contract obligations. Said the court: "Our courts are traditionally
loath to resolve such issues.
M 12
In view of the similarity between plaintiffs' cause of action and
that in the famous case of American Banana Company v. United Fruit
Company"3 the plaintiffs undertook to distinguish that case by point-
ing out that in the American Banana case, where plaintiff alleged that
the defendant conspired with officials of Costa Rica to seize plaintiff's
lands, the acts sought to be examined occurred in Costa Rica, where-
as, in the Frazier case the "persuasion" took place in the United
States. Assuming that the situation was one which called for the ap-
plication of the principle of non-review, the court properly pointed
out the error of such an analysis and approach and declared:
". .. the plaintiffs are thinking within the dimensions of their
local tort action, rather than of the preponderating international con-
siderations. The decisive act in the alleged repudiation of the con-
tract was the enactment of the law by the Congress of Peru.""' 4
This error of confusing or mistaking this well-established Anglo-
American policy of judicial refusal to review foreign acts of govern-
ment (characterized as the "act of state" doctrine, "rule of decision"
principle, etc.), with conflict of laws choice of law rules is not un-
common. 15 This was one of the reasons which prompted the adop-
110 283 App. Div. 44, 48, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 900, 903 (1st Dep't 1953).
.111 Ibid. (emphasis added).
112 Ibid.
113 213 U. S. 347, 29 S. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909).
114 Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. et al., 283 App. Div.
44, 49, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 900, 904 (1st Dep't 1953).
115 See discussion of Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of Statep 59
L. Q. Rev. 42, 56 (1943) in RE, FoRnErN COiNqSCATIONS nT ANGo-AmEcA LAw
159-163 (New York, 1951). For a criticism of the Frazier case on the ground that the
court did not "apply conffict of laws principles in determining whether there was a
contract with the foreign state, what were the terms of the alleged contract, whether
there had been a breach of such contract according to the applicable rules of law,
whether such a breach had been occasioned by the action of the defendant, whether
such action constituted a tort under the lex loci delicti . . ." see 53 Mich. L. Rev. 293,
295 (1954).
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tion of the approach and language of the Ricaud case,1 6 to wit, that
the principle "requires only that when it is made to appear that the
foreign government has acted in a given way on the subject matter
of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result
cannot be questioned, but must be accepted by our courts as a rule
for their decision."' "7
Judge Wallace in the Court of Appeals decision of Underhill v.
Hernandez uttered the oft-quoted words that to permit sovereign acts
or political transactions of states to be subjected to the examination
of the courts of other states "would imperil the amicable relations
between governments, and vex the peace of nations."1 8 But in the
Frazier case it was possible to determine the issues without examin-
ing the sovereign acts of Peru. The legality or effectiveness of the
Peruvian statute that prejudiced the plaintiffs was not in issue. The
plaintiffs did not wish to deprive anyone of title to any scrip certifi-
cates. In no way, therefore, was it sought to question the legal effect
of any act of Peru. In no way could the decision affect the title
to anything involved in the action. Plaintiffs were seeking to prove
that defendants wrongfully induced a sovereign nation to breach its
contract. The court, however, seemed to feel squeamish about al-
lowing a plaintiff to prove that a sovereign state had breached a con-
tract, and hence, avoided such a possibility by declaring applicable
the principle of non-review. For these reasons it is fair to say that
the case has extended the applicability of the principle where it was
not sought to contest, undo or otherwise affect the foreign act of gov-
ernment. Again, one observes, particularly on the part of the lower
courts, the judicial reluctance to exercise jurisdiction in matters that
appear to have international political implications.
A case roughly analogous to the American Banana Company
case" 9 and Stark v. Home Sound Co. et al.'2 ° is Pasos v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways decided by the United States District Court for
116 RE, FoREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN AN Co-Au2MCAN LAW 19-21, 33 (New York,
1951).
117 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 307, 38 S. Ct. 312, 316, 62
L. Ed. 733, 735 (1918).
118 65 Fed. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895).
119 213 U. S. 347, 29 S. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909).
120 148 Misc. 686, 266 N. Y. Supp. 368 (Sup. Ct. Chemung Co. 1933), aff'd,
241 App. Div. 637, 269 N. Y. Supp. 936 (3d Dep't 1934), amended, 242 App. Div. 668,
271 N. Y. Supp. 1097 (3d Dep't 1934).
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the Southern District of New York."2 In this case the plaintiff sued
for trespass and injury to real property in Nicaragua. Apparently, in
1929 the defendant began using an airfield on Nicaragua formerly oc-
cupied by the United States Marines. The Marines had occupied this
land as an airfield, with the approval of the Nicaraguan Government,
since 1927. When the Marines left Nicaragua in 1933, the Govern-
ment permitted the defendant to continue to use such airfield.
In dismissing the action, the District Court said the following in
a memorandum opinion:
"This court will not pass judgment upon the acts of a foreign
sovereign within its own borders.... The plaintiff does not purport
to contest the validity of acts of the Nicaragua Government; he mere-
ly urges an interpretation of those acts that is consistent with his
causes of action. The Government of Nicaragua, in a diplomatic
note forwarded by the Department of State through the Attorney
General and the United States Attorney for this district, has taken
the position that the validity and legality of the acts of the sovereign
Government of Nicaragua are being attacked in this suit. The De-
partment of State, however, has made no suggestion of immunity to
the court, but has instead maintained a position of 'courteous neu-
trality.' "122
B. CONFISCATION BY FOREIGN RATE OF EXCHANGE.-In 1939,
Section 269 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act was expanded so
as to authorize the deposit of monies or property in the Surrogate's
Court in cases where the transmission or payment to a legatee, dis-
tributee, or beneficiary resident in a foreign country might be circum-
vented by measures resulting in a complete or partial confiscation.
The relevant portion of the section provides:
"Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary
of a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money
or other property due him, or where other special circumstances make
it appear desirable that such payment should be withheld, the decree
may direct that such money or other property be paid into the surro-
121 Civ. No. 33-273 (unreported) June 7, 1954, Edelstein, D. J.; digested in 49
Am. J. Int'l L. 256 (1955).
122 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 256 (1955). The principle was also referred to in Naam-
loze etc. v. The Chase National Bank et al., 111 F. Supp. 833, 845 (S. D. N. Y. 1953)
which involved decrees of the Netherlands Indies. The District Court- stated: "The
obligatory purchase of government bonds with half of plaintiff's account balance in
Indonesia is an act of a foreign government done within its own territory having no
necessary relation to the foreign exchange control law. Our courts have consistently
refused to pass on such acts."
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gate's court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of
a trust or such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be
entitled thereto."
In 1953, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Braier's Estate
123
sustained its constitutionality and held that it did not contravene
Article XXXI of the treaty between the United States and Hun-
gary,124 nor did it encroach upon the power of the United States
over foreign commerce.
Illustrative of the cases that have applied Section 269 of the
New York Surrogate's Court Act2'2 and the comparable Regulations
of the United States Treasury Department 20 is In re Wells' Estate.'2
In this accounting proceeding legacies were left to Czechoslovakian
and Hungarian nationals who resided abroad. They were represented
by their respective Consuls who asked for the transmission of the
funds to the legatees. The executors objected on the ground that
the legatees would not obtain the benefit, use and control of the
money, and hence, asked that it be withheld pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 269.
The court observed that the Section is neither punitive nor re-
taliatory nor does it divest a beneficiary of his inheritance. "On the
contrary, its aim is to protect the interests of the beneficiary, to
guard and preserve his inheritance until he is able freely and fully
to enjoy and use it and to defend it against the efforts of foreign
governments either to seize it forcibly or to drain it gradually through
a variety of devices and practices.'
128
In these cases it is important to note that the beneficiaries make
no request for a transfer of the money. Also, many witnesses who
have lived in the countries concerned testify that, through rates of
123 305 N. Y. 148, 111 N. E. 2d 424 (1953); 305 N. Y. 691, 112 N. E. 2d 774
(1953).
124 44 Stat. 2459 (1925).
125 Wong Hoen's Estate, 199 Misc. 119, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 407 (Surr. Ct., Kings
Co., 1951); Yee Yoke Man's Estate, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 221 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1951);
Thomae's Estate, 199 Misc. 940, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 844 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1951);
Best's Estate, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (Surr. Ct., Suffolk Co., 1951); Getream's Estate,
107 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (Surr. Ct. Suffolk Co., 1951); Mark's Estate, 115 N. Y. S. 2d
174 (Surr. Ct., Kings Co., 1952) ; Matter of Braier's Estate, 305 N. Y. 148, 111 N. E. 2d
424 (1953); Klein's Estate, 203 Misc. 762, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 866 (Surr. Ct., Saratoga
Co., 1953).
126 Geffen's Estate, 278 App. Div. 770, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 490 (2d Dep't 1951).
127 204 Misc. 975, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1953).
12 126 N. Y. S. 2d 441, 444 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1953).
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exchange or other constraining and confiscatory measures, the coun-
tries involved and not the legatees would become the principal bene-
ficiaries of the funds.
From the evidence, since it appeared that the foreign rate of
exchange would confiscate the. greater part of the inheritance, and
the beneficiaries could "spend the balance only for purchases at ex-
cessive prices", or could save it "only at the risk of losing it," the
inheritance was retained under the authority of Section 269 of the
Surrogate's Court Act." 9
These cases have afforded the courts an opportunity to deter-
mine the effect to be given to the certificates of foreign Ministers.
For example, in In re Siegler's Will, 30 the Hungarian Consul General
representing certain Hungarian legatees, appealed from an order of
the Surrogate directing the executor to pay the legacies into court
under the authority of Section 269 of the Surrogate's Court Act. The
issue was whether the circumstances were such as to warrant the
application of that section. The Hungarian Minister Plenipotentiary
stated that the legatees would receive the full benefit, use and control
of the legacies and that between 1947 and 1953 the Hungarian Con-
sular Section transmitted $100,000 to Hungarian residents. The Sur-
rogate also had before him two letters, one from the Department of
Justice and the other from the Department of State, calling the court's
attention to the Treasury Regulation forbidding the transmission of
checks to Hungarian residents on the ground that conditions in Hun-
gary made it uncertain that the payees would either receive them or
be able to negotiate them at full value. The Appellate Division made
the following statement about the certificate of the Envoy:
"In normal times we assume that a local court would probably
accept the certificate of an Envoy to this country from a friendly
power as to internal conditions in his country. But these are not
normal times .... Indeed it is quite apparent from the utterances of
two governmental departments that the United States has no policy
that would require a local court to give full faith and credit to the
certificate of the Hungarian Envoy. We conclude therefore that the
Surrogate was not bound by the certificate."''
These cases involving the application of Section 269 should not
129 Id. at 449.
130 284 App. Div. 436, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 392 (3d Dep't 1954).
131 Id. at 440, 132 N. Y. S. 2d at 395. See also Matter of Braier's Estate, 305
N. Y. 148, 111 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
be confused with the situation presented in Perutz v. Bohemian Dis-
count Bank' which involved a contract of employment made in
Czechoslovakia by a then Czechoslovakian citizen with a Czechoslo-
vakian bank. Pursuant to this contract the defendant agreed to pay
the plaintiff a certain pension at the place of business of the bank.
Currency regulations of Czechoslovakia forbade a resident to make
any payment in currency or in foreign exchange to a nonresident of
that country, and also provided that a nonresident judgment creditor
could not enforce a judgment in Czechoslovakia, unless the payment
was licensed by the Czechoslovakian currency control authority. The
defendant credited the amount of the pension due the plaintiff in
Czechoslovakian crowns in a blocked account pursuant to the law of
Czechoslovakia. The plaintiff sued in the New York Supreme Court
by attaching money of the bank in this state to recover a judgment
in United States dollars. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appel-
late Division and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the com-
plaint, stating:
"A contract made in a foreign country by citizens thereof and
intended by them to be there performed is governed by the law of
that country. . . . Our courts may, however, refuse to give effect to
a foreign law that is contrary to our public policy. . . . But the
Czechoslovakian currency laws in question cannot here be deemed to
be offensive on that ground, since our Federal Government and the
Czechoslovakian Government are members of the International Mone-
tary Fund established by the Bretton Woods Agreement."' 83
In situations calling for the application of Section 269 of the
Surrogate's Court Act, one sees a manifestation of the public policy
which refuses to grant any effect to a confiscatory decree in relation
to a res with a domestic situs. Since no effect will be given to a for-
eign decree confiscating property located here,'34 likewise property
132 Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N. Y. 533, 110 N. E. 2d 6 (1953).
133 304 N.Y. 533, 537, 110 N. E. 2d 67 (1953). See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichbahn
Gesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. 2d 798 (1938); Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assurance Co., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934). As for the actual holding of the
Perutz case it has been said that it "is consistent with previously settled conflict of
laws principles . . .", Report of Committee on Foreign Law of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York; "Foreign Exchange Control in New York Courts,"
9 The Record 239, 241 (May 1954). For references to the great number of cases that
dealt with the effect to he accorded foreign exchange controls see Meyer, Recognition
of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 Yale L. J.
867 (1953). See also Friedmann, Foreign Exchange Control in American Courts, 26
St. John's L. Rev. 97 (1951).
134 Notes 62 supra, and 144 infra. For a treatment of the importance of situs in
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located here will not be transmitted to a foreign country where a con-
fiscation is likely to follow.
It may be stated in passing that certain problems of confiscation
of property have been considered by the Tax Court where a taxpayer
has sought to declare a "loss deduction" for such confiscated prop-
erty. It has been indicated that the Internal Revenue Code'135 affords
some relief to the American taxpayer who, because of confiscation,
has suffered a loss of property located abroad.136 In these cases in
order to allow the loss deduction the taxpayer must satisfactorily
prove the taking of the property or that it has been rendered worth-
less. There must be evidence to prove the seizure and confisca-
tion. 37 Where such evidence is not produced the deduction is dis-
allowed.1
3 8
C. CONFISCATION BY CURRENCY REFORM OF AMERICAN MrLi-
TARY COMMANDER.-The allegation of confiscation by the United
States was raised in a rather novel way in the United States Court
of Claims case of Eisner v. United States.'39 The plaintiff sued for
what was asserted to be the "taking of her property." The property
consisted of a deposit of Reichmarks in a German bank in Berlin,
which by order of the American Military Commander was converted
into a new type of currency, Deutsche Marks, at the rate of one for
20. The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of the United States, alleges
that this confiscated 95 per cent of her bank account, and when
she accepted the new Deutsche Marks she reserved her right to sue
for the alleged loss.
conflict of laws problems, see Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles: A False
Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195-196 (1954) wherein the author dis-
cusses the "'jurisdictional rule' under which the forum recognizes the exclusive legis-
lative power of the situs to delimit interests in tangibles and . . .the 'choice of law'
rule by which the situs refers to the law of a foreign state to effectuate its own par-
ticular policies regarding the matter litigated."
135 Section 23 (e) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code; Section 165 (c) of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code.
136 See Dach and Ujlaki, Tax Aspects of Foreign Confiscations, 21 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 447 (1953); RE, NATIONALIZATION AND THE INVESTMENT Or CAPITAL ABROAD, 42
Geo. L. J. 44, 67 (1953).
'37 See Solt v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 19 T. C. 183 (1952).
138 Envin de Reitzes-Marienwert v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 21 T. C. 846
(1954); Estate of Wladimir Von Dattan, 22 T. C. 1 (1954).
139 117 F. Supp. 197 (Ct. Cl. 1954). See Report of Committee on Law "of Occu-
pied Areas, Section of International and Comparative Law, American Bar Association,
Section Proceedings, 107, 108 (1954).
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The court held that "plaintiff is not entitled to recover. ' 140 It
was pointed out that many changes of law or Government policy may
result in hardships, but such hardships cannot be regarded as cre-
ating claims against the government. It was stated that American
officials in Germany "might have treated the pre-occupation claims
against Berlin banks as worthless, and given them no conversion
value in the new, sound currency." '
Although it is unfortunate that the court did not cite any cases,
since it is impossible to know the authority upon which it relied,
it declared:
"The currency reform here in question was a sovereign act,
reasonably calculated to accomplish a beneficial purpose, and if it did
have any adverse effect upon the plaintiff, she cannot, under well-
settled principles, shift that effect to the public treasury.' 42
Clearly legitimate governmental power to reform the currency
would be considered by our courts as "acts of Government" that would
not be reviewed. Hence, if the currency reform had been effected by a
foreign country, and an action were later brought against the bank
where the deposit had been made, assuming such bank had a branch
here for purposes of jurisdiction, the foreign act of government
would, under the existing principle of abstention, not be reviewed.4
IV. INEFFECTIVENESS OF CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY
BEYOND JURISDICTION
NOTWITHSTANDING the force of the principle that the munici-
pal law of a nation may directly affect all things within its territory,
it is equally true that it is only by the comity of nations that the
laws of one country may affect property outside of its territory.
Comity implies that a forum may completely disregard foreign law;
hence, it is for the forum to determine under what circumstances and
to what extent foreign law may be deemed to have operative effect
within its jurisdiction. Just as the courts have refused to review
official acts of foreign governments that affected property within their
140 Id. at 199.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid. The court added that bankruptcy and reorganization laws are also not
regarded as confiscatory.
143 See discussion and citation of authorities under Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders
Protective Council, Inc., notes 103-117 supra.
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own territory, courts have also refused to give extraterritorial effect
to the decrees of foreign governments purporting to affect a res be-
yond its territory when to have done so would have offended the
public policy of the forum.144 Following the broad principle that
"the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another,"'145 the
courts have consistently refused to give effect to the confiscatory
measures of foreign countries as to a res having a domestic situs.'48
In this area the courts have followed the well-charted course estab-
lished by the "Russian" confiscation cases whereby no courts give
effect to such confiscatory decrees either before 47 or after 14  the
diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia.
In Latvian State Cargo and Passenger Line v. United States, 49
the plaintiff, a corporation organized by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the purpose of operating naitonalized Lithuanian ves-
sels, sued the United States for the value of the S.S. Denny which
it had requisitioned in 1942. Plaintiff's right to recover depended
upon its title to the vessel, which in turn was based upon the Lithu-
anian "nationalization" decree, since prior thereto the vessel was
owned by a private Lithuanian corporation. The court stated:
"The Executive Department of our Government has refused to
recognize the incorporation of Lithuania into the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and has refused to recognize the validity of any
144 Plesch et al. v. Banque Nationale de ]a Republique d'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224,
77 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dep't 1948) aff'd, 298 N. Y. 573, 81 N. E. 2d 106 (1948);
Bollack v. Societe Generale Pour Favoriser Le Developpement du Commerce et de
L'Industrie en France, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term N. Y.
Co. 1941), rev'd, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 986 (1st Dep't 1942) motion for
leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, 264 App. Div. 767, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 717
(1st Dep't 1942); Weber v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1939); A/S Mer-
laid & Co. v. Chase National Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 377 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
Term 1947); Banque Mellie Iran v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 188 Misc. 346, 64 N. Y.
S. 2d 804 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1946).
145 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66 (U. S. 1825).
148 See, however, note 63 supra.
147 Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommershesky Bank v. The National City Bank
of N. Y., 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 878, 51 S. Ct.
81, 75 L. Ed. 775 (1930); James & Co. v. Russia Ins. Co. Am., 247 N. Y. 262, 160
N. E. 364 (1928); Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E.
703 (1925); James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369
(1925).
148 Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).
See cases cited in United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. 2d
758 (1939), judgment affirmed by an equally divided court, 309 U. S. 624, 60 S. Ct.
725, 84 L. Ed. 986 (1940).
149 116 F. Supp. 717 (U. S. Ct. Claims 1953).
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decrees issued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of the
People's Commissars of Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania rela-
tive to persons and property within the territory of Lithuania. That
action having been taken by the Executive Department of our Gov-
ernment, the courts have also uniformly refused to recognize the val-
idity of such decrees."' 50
In discussing the plaintiff's petition the Court added:
"Moreover, at the time of the promulgation of the decrees in
question, the steamship Denny was in the port of New Jersey, United
States of America. Whatever validity may be accorded to such acts
and decrees as to property within the territory of the country an-
nexed, no court has ever accorded validity to them as to property out-
side of such territory at the time of the annexation and the de-
crees.'
n5 1
This 1953 Latvian State Cargo case perpetuates the confusion
that has existed as to the element of diplomatic non-recognition of the
foreign government by the Executive.'52 It is to be compared with a
prior case, The Denny, 53 wherein the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, notwithstanding diplomatic non-recognition of Lithuania,
stated that it could not ignore that the Soviet Socialist Government
actually exercised governmental authority in Lithuania at the time
of the decrees, and therefore "must treat its acts within its own terri-
tory as valid and binding upon its nationals domiciled therein." 1"4
A case analogous to the recent Latvian State Cargo decision is
The Maret,"' where, in spite of the importance attributed to diplo-
matic recognition, it is evident that the basis of decision was the fact
that the foreign government had no jurisdiction over the vessel there-
in involved when it purported to "nationalize" it. In The Maret, an
Esthonian decree could not effectively "change the ownership of a
chattel many hundreds of miles away from its borders,"'50 just as in
the Latvian State Cargo case157 the Lithuanian decree could not trans-
fer title to a vessel located in the United States. It is interesting to
150 Id. at 720.
151 Ibid.
152 See The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431 (3rd Cir. 1944).
153 127 F. 2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1942).
154 Id. at 410.
155 Note 152 supra.
156 Concurring opinion of Judge Clark in The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431, 444, 445
(3rd Cir. 1944). At the time of the decree the vessel was in the port of St. Thomas
in the Virgin Islands.
157 116 F. Supp. 717 (U. S. Ct. Claims 1953).
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note, in these cases, that, although the courts properly make refer-
ence to the situs of the vessels, such a reference to what may be re-
garded as the crucial point is appended to the opinion in the nature
of an afterthought. 15 8 The principle of non-review is limited to acts
of government within its territory. "Legislative fiat"'159 purporting
to affect a res located elsewhere is not an act within the scope of the
principle. In such cases there can be no "seizure," hence, the effect
to be given to such decrees is to be determined strictly by the requi-
sites of comity 60 Difficulties may exist to determine the actual situs
of an asset, but, once it is determined that it is in this country, no
extraterritorial effect will be given to the effort of a foreign sovereign
to confiscate it,'6 ' in the absence of an overriding national policy.
16 2
The New York Courts have scrupulously adhered to this poli-
cy.' 3 In an action by a stockholder against a corporation nation-
alized in Czechoslovakia, "now ruled by a government which does not
recognize private property,"' the New York Supreme Court repeat-
ed that "the courts of this State deny any validity to effect such na-
tionalization as to assets within the State of New York."
65
158 See note 134 supra.
159 RE, FORE=G CONFISCATIONS fT AINGLo-AEicAN LAW 125 (New York, 1951).
160 See discussion of cases in Re, op. cit. supra 105-127.
161 See Baglin v. Cusenier Company, 221 U. S. 580, 591, 31 S. Ct. 669, 671, 55 L.
Ed. 863, 869 (1911) which involved the liquidation in the French courts of the properties
of the Carthusian monks who made a liquer by a secret process at their monastery of
La Grande Chartreuse. It was held that foreign trademark rights did not pass to
the liquidator. "The monks' secret was not the subject of seizure by the liquidator,
and did not pass to him." Since the French law was deemed to be a "penal law" it
was given no extraterritorial effect in England. Lecouturier v. Rey [19101 A. C. 265.
162 See Zwack, et al. v. Kraus Bros. & Co., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 963 (S. D. N. Y.
1950) (No extraterritorial effect would be given to decrees of Hungarian Government
purporting to confiscate American trademarks. "Property here in suit was in the
United States and no national policy requires this court to recognize the validity of
its confiscation by Hungarian government." See note 62 supra. See, also, Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Record Corp., 109 Fed. Supp. 330, 338-339 (S. D. N. Y.
1952).
163 Notes 144, 147, 148 supra.
164 Augstein v. Banska A. Hutni Akciova Spolecnost et al., 124 N. Y. S. 2d 446
(Spec. Term Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1953), modified, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 647 (1953).
165 Id. at 447. The court also indicated that the plaintiff as a stockholder "has
the right to avail himself of all remedies open to stockholders of corporations under
§ 977-b of the Civil Practice Act." The Court stated that the public policy of the
State is expressed in Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369,
189 N. E. 456 (1934) and that following the pronouncement of policy therein con-
tained the Legislature enacted in § 977-b of the Civil Practice Act that "any confisca-
tory law or decree thereof, shall not be deemed to have any extraterritorial effect or
validity as to the property, tangible or intangible, debts, demands or choses in action
of such corporation within the state."
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V. EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF DECREES OF
GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE
IT became apparent some years ago that the courts had taken an
understanding and cooperative attitude toward the expropriatory de-
crees of the governments in exile. In Anderson v. N.V. Transandine
Handelmaatschappij,166 the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York gave effect to the decrees of the Royal Netherlands Govern-
ment in exile as to property located in New York. Such decrees were
referred to as the decrees of a "friendly foreign sovereign" and
"protective" in nature. The Court of Appeals stated:
"By comity of nations, rights based upon the law of a foreign
State to intangible property, which has a situs in this State, are rec-
ognized and enforced by the courts of this State, unless such en-
forcement would offend the public policy of this State."' 67
The court agreed that confiscatory decrees of foreign countries
will not be given extraterritorial effect as to a res having a domestic
situs, but, said the court:
"Here the challenged decree [of May 24, 1940] does not in pur-
pose or effect violate that rule. Under its terms, the State becomes in
effect a trustee for its subjects of their property which might other-
wise be without protection and perhaps subject to seizure by a ruth-
less enemy."'""
The policy of the Anderson case has been adopted by the Fed-
eral courts sitting in New York,69 where, by "comity," the State of
the Netherlands was allowed to maintain an action to replevy securi-
ties claimed to have been looted by the Germans during their occu-
pation of Holland which were deposited in a New York bank.
170
Nevertheless, in 1951, in State of the Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank,'7' the District Court, fully appreciative of the reasons
underlying the Anderson case, aware of the fact that a similar policy
166 289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. 2d 502 (1942).
167 Id. at 19, 43 N. E. 2d 502 (1942).
168 Ibid. See Note, Protective E~xpropriatary Decrees of the Governments in Exile,
41 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1941).
169 See Cardozo, International Law in the New York Court--1953, 40 Cornell L. Q.
97, 98 (1954); cf. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins Applied to Interna-
tional Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740 (1939).
170 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 79 F. Supp. 966 (S. D.
N. Y. 1948).
171 99 F. Supp. 655 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
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prevailed in England,'72 and fully cognizant of the fact that such
views had been relied upon in 1948 by the United States District
Court in sustaining the validity of the complaint in the original de-
cision, 7' decided that "changed circumstances, and different facts,
require that the application of the Anderson case to the present situa-
tion be closely scrutinized.' 7
4
The court indicated the factual difference in the cases:
"The bonds, in the case at bar, were located within the Nether-
lands territory that was under military occupation by Germany at
the time Decree A-1 was enacted . 5 In the Anderson case, the dis-
puted property was at all material times situated within the United
States."'
76
Citing various authorities the court believed that although the
government in exile could legislate for its citizens regarding assets
located outside of its occupied territory, it could not transfer title
to assets in its territory under enemy military occupation.
7 7
Citing the Ricaud,17 Oetjen 79 and Bernstein'8 ° cases, the court
said that in reaching its decision there was one point that deserved
"brief mention," namely, "the rule that has been consistently fol-
lowed that our courts do not question the validity of the acts of for-
eign governments that affect property within the territorial jurisdic-
tions of those governments.''8
However, since the court demonstrated that the "absent sover-
eign lacked the authority to legislate, effectively, for the occupied
areas," the rule was inapplicable since it "must apply only insofar
as it is conceded that the foreign government acted within its terri-
torial jurisdiction."8 2
172 Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., Ltd., [1942] 2 K. B. 202 (Decree of Norwegian
government in exile was deemed effective to vest in absent Norwegian Sovereign title
to vessels located outside Norway and belonging to nationals inside occupied Norway).
'73 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 79 F. Supp. 966 (S. D.
N. Y. 1948).
174 99 F. Supp. 655, 659-660 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
175 Decree of May 24, 1940, being the same decree involved in the other "Dutch"
cases.
176 99 F. Supp. 655, 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
'77 Id. at 661.
178 Note 25 supra.
179 Note 24 supra.
180 Note 26 supra.
181 Note 176 suprta t 663.
182 Ibid.
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It was not surprising that the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the statement of the law in the Anderson case was not only in
complete accord with the international policy of the United States,
but that it was "still a correct exposition of our policy."'813
The Court of Appeals did not agree that the physical location
of bonds determines their situs for all purposes,184 and concluded
that modern authority "points to the enforceability of this decree
under international law."'85
The court held that, subsequent to the Regulations respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, ratified by the United
States as an annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907,180 a
military occupant did not succeed to sovereignty over occupied ter-
ritory but acquired only a limited administrative authority. This
"legitimate legislative authority" is further circumscribed by specific
provisions such as the prohibition against the confiscation of private
property. 18 7 Consequently, although the absentee sovereign could not
interfere with the occupant's legitimate power, he could "legislate
over occupied territory insofar as such enactments do not conflict
with the legitimate rule of the occupying power.",' Not only was
the court's position simplified by the provision of a specific conven-
183 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F. 2d 455, 460 (2d Cir.
1953).
184 Citing Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 189 F. 2d 744 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd,
342 U. S. 330, 72 S. Ct. 334, 92 L. Ed. 359 (1952), the court stated that, as applied
to the problems of looting securities by a conquering power, the situs of the debt
should be determined by the residence of the debtor rather than the location of the
bond itself. See International Law-Right of an Exiled De Jure Government to Legis-
late for its Territory Occupied by a De Facto Government, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
764, 767 (1952); Comment: Negotiable Instruments-Situs of Bearer Bonds Under
the Trading with Eneny Act, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1057, 1066 (1952).
185 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F. 2d 455, 461 (2d
Cir. 1953).
186 36 Stat. 2277, 2295 (1909).
187 Hague Regulations, Article 46. See Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602
(D. Utah 1951). McNAiR, LEGAL Errcrs or WAR (3d ed. Cambridge 1948); FEacir-
ENFE=D, TnE INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMc LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (Washing-
ton, 1942).
188 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F. 2d 455, 462 (2d Cir.
1953). Cf. Amstelbank v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 177 Misc. 548, 552, 31
N. Y. S. 2d 194, 199 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1941) wherein Mr. Justice Pecora said:
"In withholding recognition of the Nazi regime in continental Netherlands, the gov-
ernment of the United States has made a determination of policy which our courts
should follow. Therefore, any German decrees promulgated in the Netherlands should
be given no force or effect whatever in the determination of questions involving prop-
erty in this State." See Note, The Extraterritorial Effect of Confiscatory Decrees,
17 St. John's L. Rev. 20, 26-27 (1942).
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tion forbidding looting and confiscation but the court also remarked
that "the claim of the Netherlands does not compete with any valid
rights of United States residents."
1"9
With the limitation that may be inferred from the statement con-
cerning the rights of United States residents, the court accepted as
settled the policy that the protective expropriatory decrees of the
governments in exile will be given effect. Whether the property was
located in this country or in the occupied territory, such decrees are
neither against our public policy nor international law.190
VI. EXECUTIVE POLICY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
ABSTENTION: THE BERNSTEIN CASES
As stated previously, 9' the most significant development in the
traditional application of the principle, that the courts will not ex-
amine the acts of a foreign government acting within its own terri-
tory, is to be found in the precedent-shattering climax to the Bern-
stein cases. 92
The efforts of the plaintiff to obtain the assets of the Bernstein
Lines, of which he was sole stockholder, were fruitless because of the
now famous decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres. The court, applying strictly
the principle or doctrine of non-reviewability of the acts of a foreign
government performed within its own territory, in effect held that the
legality of the acts of Nazi officials in Germany was not a justiciable
issue in the American courts.
The Van Heyghen Freres case, however, indicated that since the
principle is essentially a matter of international relations on which
the Executive is the final authority, if the Executive demonstrated an
affirmative intention to remove this commonly accepted judicial re-
straint, the courts would follow the Executive policy thus ex-
pressed."9 4
In another action against the Holland-America Line, a Dutch
189 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F. 2d 455, 463 (2d Cir.
1953).
10 Cf. Bank Voor Handel en Scheepvaart v. Stafford, [1951] 2 All. E. R. 779
(K. B.); see Drucker, Foreign Property Legislation, 2 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 391 (1953).
191 Note 102 supra.
192 Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 210 F. 2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
93 Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
194 Id. at 249.
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corporation, Bernstein alleged that the Holland-America Line acquired
the assets of the Red Star Line, of which company he was the sole
owner, knowing that he had transferred these assets under duress. Un-
questionably, because of what the court had said in the Van Heyghen
Freres case, that the principle would only apply to an official act
of government and not to an act of disposition by private parties,
Bernstein submitted an amended complaint in which he set forth the
allegations of duress without mentioning the Nazi officials.0 5 In the
second action, decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949,1'° the court
said that any amendment must contain an allegation that the duress
was not caused by the action of such officials and, in addition, should
specify with reasonable detail the persons by whom and the manner
in which the duress was exercised. Bernstein believed that he would
have been able to meet this requirement by proof that an alleged
agent of the defendant, Holland-America Lines, had successfully pro-
cured Bernstein's signature to the transfer by telling Bernstein what
would be the consequences (presumably death) if he failed to sign.
In addition to Bernstein's present ability to plead private duress,
he also attached to his new complaint a copy of a press release from
the State Department which contained a letter from the Acting Legal
Adviser of the State Department. This letter, addressed to counsel
for plaintiff, stated:
"The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in
the United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or com-
pensation in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a
result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."'1
90
Although this letter, if given effect, would have clearly relieved
the Court from the restraint of the so-called "act of state" doctrine,
District Judge Dimock'98 refused to consider it based upon the "well-
established doctrine that the mandate of an appellate court is bind-
ing on the lower court and that the lower court is powerless to re-
'95 Bemstein v. Nederiandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 76 Fed. Supp. 335 (S. D.
N. Y. 1948).
196 173 Fed. 2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
197 20 Dep't State Bull. 592-593 (1949).
198 Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 117 Fed. Supp. 898 (S. D.
N. Y. 1953).
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determine any matters passed upon by the Appellate court."' 99 Judge
Dimock informed the parties that, upon the trial, he would refuse to
consider the State Department's press release unless the plaintiff
would obtain from the Court of Appeals an amendment of its man-
date or instructions which would make such consideration proper.
In order to consider the State Department's letter, therefore, Bern-
stein moved before the Court of Appeals for an amendment of its
mandate.
The decision was rendered on the 5th of February, 19542°° and
Circuit Judges Augustus N. Hand, Clark and Frank, in a per curiam
opinion, decided:
"In the prior appeal in this case, 173 Fed. 2d 71, because of the
lack of a definitive expression of Executive policy, we felt constrained
to follow the decision of this court in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres, 163 Fed. 2d 246, by ordering the plaintiff to refrain from al-
leging matters which would cause the court to pass upon the validity
of acts of officials of the German government. Following our de-
cision, however, the State Department issued press release No. 296
on April 27, 1949 entitled 'Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re
Suits For Identifiable Property in Nazi Forced Transfers.' "2o
The release contained a copy of the letter of April 13, 1949 from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser for the State Department. After
quoting the pertinent part of Mr. Tate's letter the court concluded:
"In view of this supervening expression of Executive policy, we
amend our mandate in this case by striking out all restraint based
on the inability of the court to pass on acts of officials in Germany
during the period in question. See 173 F. 2d at pages 75-76. This
will permit the District Court to accept the release in evidence and
conduct the trial in this case without regard to the restraint we pre-
viously placed upon it."2"2
This decision finally moulded into law the suggestion of the Van
Heyghen Freres case. Because of the definitive expression of Execu-
tive policy, as evidenced by the State Department's press release, the
court had been relieved of its traditional restraint. The result was in-
deed welcomed. For the first time an American court could review
and examine an act of government of a foreign sovereign performed
199 Id. at 902.
200 Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc., 210 F. 2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
201 Ibid.
202 Id. at 376.
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within its territory. The courts could now grapple with the judicial
problems heretofore neatly avoided and apologetically shifted to the
State Department for whatever action it deemed appropriate through
diplomatic channels. Notwithstanding this obvious step forward,
which affords a victim of oppression and confiscation an opportunity
to determine the issues judicially before a court of law, it has been
stated that in giving effect to the State Department's press release
the court has abdicated one of its judicial functions. 0 3 In answer to
this criticism it can be stated that, if the true basis for the principle
was correctly stated in the Underhill,2 4 Oetjen °5 and Ricaud °3 cases,
the criticism is not warranted. Once it is agreed that the principle
is fundamentally involved with the nation's international and foreign
policy, it is not an abdication of the judicial function to respect and
adhere to the policy established by that branch of the government
charged with foreign affairs. Were this not to be so a uniform policy
would be impossible.
A few more words are in order as to the tribulations of Bern-
stein. Under the new ruling he would have been able to allege the
specific acts of duress of the Nazi officials. However, Bernstein had
amended his complaint and affidavits so as to allege that the acts of
duress were private acts and not official acts of government. Be-
cause of the principle of judicial estoppel that would have been in-
voked against Bernstein, it would have been only by indirection that
he could have taken advantage of the court's freedom to review the
acts of the Nazi officials. Although the trial judge had ruled that
Bernstein was limited to his allegations of private duress, he had
also ruled that the plaintiff would have been allowed to show all the
surrounding circumstances, and it would have been under this latter
ruling that the plaintiff would have proven the official duress.
All persons interested in these legal problems awaited eagerly fur-
ther judicial developments. At the trial, what "law" would have de-
termined the legality or validity of the act of transfer or disposses-
sion? Surely the conflict of laws principles are clear. The validity
203 See SEIDL-HOHENVELDERNw INTERNATIOxALES KONFISKATIONS-UND ENTERONUNG-
RECT (Berlin, 1952); Seidl-Hohenveldem, Austria Restitution Legislation, 2 Am. J.
Comp. L. 383 (1953); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Func-
tions?, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 168 (1946).
204 65 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1895); 168 U. S. 250 (1897).
205 246 U. S. 297, 18 S. Ct. 83, 62 L. Ed. 456 (1918).
206 246 U. S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62 L. Ed. 733 (1918).
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of a transfer of property is uniformly determined by the lex loci re
sitae. If the action sounded in tort the governing law would be the
lex loci delicti. The case was further complicated by the fact that
some of the operative facts had occurred in Holland. Although no
one would have differed as to these conflicts rules, it would have been
more difficult to reach agreement as to the "law" of Germany at the
time in question. Many that had followed the proceedings felt that
the law of Germany was to be determined prior to the discrimina-
tory anti-Jewish measures passed by the Nazis. To Bernstein, how-
ever, these questions became academic because at this stage of a long
and tedious litigation the case was settled and discontinued.
It is submitted that another possibility remains open to a court
freed from the application of the principle of non-review. The court,
apart from the local law, should consider giving effect to the govern-
ing principles of international law, i.e., the court should apply the
international standard of justice to determine if the act of the for-
eign sovereign falls within the concept of a denial of justice as that
standard of conduct is understood in international law20 Such an
approach would be justified by the increased concern of the com-
munity of nations over fundamental freedoms and human rights °0
and by the respected authority which declares that international law
is part of the law of the land.20 9
207 See 5 HACxWORT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 522 et seq., 537-538 (1943); Com-
ment, Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States
for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person and Property of Foreigners, 23 Am.
J. Intl L. 154 (1929). See Lissitzyn, The Meaning of the Term Denial of Justice in In-
ternational Law, 30 Am. J. Intl L. 632 (1936); Spiegel, Origin and Development of
Denial of Justice, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 63 (1938); Root, The Basis of Protection to Citi-
zens Residing Abroad, 4 Am. J. Int'l L. 517 (1910).
208 See Jzssup, A MoDur LAW or NATIONS (New York, 1948); H. LAuTE-PACnT,
INTEaNATIoNAL LAw AD Hua"ar RiGnTs (New York, 1950); Human Rights in the
United Nations, 13 U. N. Bull. No. 5 (Sept. 1, 1952), reprinted U. N. Publication 1/26
(1952).
209 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 S. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895); The
Paquette Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900) "International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of jus-
tice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their administration." In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v. Jaffrate and
others, The Times, Law Report, January 9, 1953, the Supreme Court of the Colony of
Aden examined the validity of the Iranian nationalization decrees and said: ".... fol-
lowing international law as incorporated in the domestic law of Aden, the Court must
refuse validity to the Persian oil nationalization law in so far as it related to the na-
tionalized property of the plaintiffs which might come within its territorial jurisdic-
tion."
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
AN analysis of the judicial decisions that have dealt with the ap-
plication of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the related prin-
ciple of nonreview, reveals the great extent to which the courts have
relied upon the Executive to lead the way if it became necessary to
stray from the moorings of established precedent.21 0 In both areas
the important cases recently decided by the courts, mark more clearly
the path likely to be followed in the future.
In the sovereign immunity cases it is still too soon to say that
the courts are upon the threshhold leading to the ultimate objective
imposing upon states the responsibility and duties of private litigants,
and the complete disappearance of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. Nevertheless, the "urge to grant sovereign immunity has...
lost much of its force."
211
The new State Department policy which undoubtedly Will be fol-
lowed by the courts has already substantially diminished the area in
which sovereign immunity may be claimed before the courts.21" This
policy, which placed the United States with the other nations that
adhere to the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity, has already
greatly influenced the Supreme Court.213 Together with what the
Supreme Court termed "consideration of fair play,12 4 for the first
time, a counterclaim, unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action, was
allowed to be asserted against a recognized sovereign suing in our
courts. 15 The change of policy from a "generous to a parsimonious
application of the principle of sovereign immunity,"21° although it
originated with the Executive, was further extended by the Supreme
Court in the Republic of China case.21 7 In this area, even those that
have felt that the Supreme Court has in the past evidenced too great
a respect for the Executive pronouncement218 should be pleased to ob-
serve that the Supreme Court has, in effect, invited the courts to
210 Notes 74, 96-101, 202 supra.
211 Note 89 supra.
212 Notes 36-40 supra.
213 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 75 S. Ct. 423
(1955).
214 Note 78 supra.
215 In the Cecil Associates case, note 90 supra, the court allowed a setoff to the
extent that the plaintiff sought affirmative judgment.
216 Note 84 supra.
217 Note 69 supra.
218 Note 203 supra.
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assume additional responsibility in allowing claims against a foreign
sovereign that has voluntarily resorted to our courts. Such claims
may now be allowed whether they were traditionally denominated
defenses, setoffs or counterclaims. 19
A similar trend which continues to restrict the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is noticeable in England. Although
both in England and the United States actual possession of a vessel
by a sovereign continues to be sufficient to warrant the application of
the doctrine,220 the Juan Ysmael case221 held that if the sovereign
asserts ownership, the claim of sovereign immunity will not beupheld
if the title asserted is "manifestly defective." This English decision
repudiates any former position that would have granted sovereign
immunity simply by a "mere assertion of it" by the sovereign. 222
Hereafter, both in England and the United States, an unsupported
claim of immunity is no longer sufficient.
223
None of the foregoing, however, is to be construed as implying
that courts will now undertake to decide questions that they con-
sider to be within the sphere of the political branch of government
or matters of foreign policy or international relations. For example,
if the Executive recognizes a foreign sovereign, that sovereign may
sue in our courts, and no matter how strained may be our relations
with the foreign sovereign, the question of "friendliness" is a subject
for political and not judicial determination.1
224
An analysis of the cases will also be enlightening to the Execu-
tive. Although in matters of "international cognizance ' 22 5 the courts
will look to the Executive policy, they will not deviate from judicial
precedent unless there be a "definitive expression of Executive
policy.
'226
The most recent Bernstein case,227 contrasted with the Frazier
case, 22 8 indicates that, unless the courts have been relieved by a suffi-
219 See note 86 supra for the statement of the dissent that actions brought by a
foreign sovereign are now "subject to every counterclaim their debtors can acquire
against them at par or at a discount."
220 Notes 67, 68 supra.
221 Note 46 supra.
222 Note 57 supra.
223 Notes 56, 57 supra.
224 Note 95 supra.
225 Note 99 supra.
226 Note 100 supra.
227 Note 192 supra.
228 Note 103 supra.
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ciently clear expression of Executive policy of their "inability" to pass
upon the acts of foreign governments performed within their own
territory,229 the force of the principle remains unshaken. In the
Frazier case, since the legality of the Peruvian statute that prejudiced
the rights of the plaintiffs had not been placed in issue, it would have
been possible to endeavor to show that the conduct of the defendant
had been wrongful without passing upon the sovereign acts of Peru.
Nevertheless, the court would not permit the plaintiffs to show that
Peru had "repudiated" any contract made with them and thus avoid-
ed all issues by finding refuge behind the "preponderating interna-
tional considerations."23 ' Whatever "extension" of the principle may
be inferred from the holding of the Frazier case is easily counter-
balanced by the development in the Bernstein case which establishes
the modus operandi for future litigants desiring to have the courts
exercise jurisdiction in an area where they have traditionally ab-
stained. It is a misunderstanding of both the principle and the hold-
ing of the Frazier case to believe that the principle has been so ex-
tended by the Frazier case so as to make it applicable to the judg-
ments and decrees of foreign courts.231 There is no principle that
commands that extraterritorial effect be given to foreign judg-
ments.
232
In other respects the courts have followed well-charted courses.
In* the absence of an overriding policy 233 the courts of this country
will not give effect to a confiscatory law of a foreign country pur-
porting to affect property located in this country.234 This policy finds
legislative expression in statutes such as New York Surrogate's Court
Act, Section 269235 and New York Civil Practice Act, Section
977-b.236 There can be no doubt that whatever effect is to be given
to a foreign law purporting to affect a res within this country is to
229 Note 202 supra.
230 Note 114 sura.
231 "Therefore, as the law stands to date, our courts will not sit in judgment on
the validity of acts done by a sovereign government within its legislative, judicial or
administrative jurisdiction." Note, Intergovernmental Immunity, 8 Miami L. Rev. 632,
635 (1954).
232 See authorities cited in RE, FORFIGN CONISCATIONS 3N ANGLo-AmmRICAN LAW
59-60 (1951).
233 Note 63 supra.
234 Notes 62, 144, 161, 162 supra.
235 See note 125 supra, and In re Well's Estate, note 127 supra.
236 See the Augstein case, notes 164, 165 supra, and the Kiuerschner case, note 62
supra.
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be determined strictly on the basis of comity. It is on this basis
that the courts have adhered to the policy enunciated in the Anderson
case,2 37 concerning the decrees of the Netherlands government in
exile. 3 Since those decrees were neither confiscatory nor penal, to
give them extraterritorial effect was to serve the ends of justice. To
date, however, it cannot be said that such an end has been attained
in all of the cases that dealt with the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the principle of non-review of the foreign acts of government.
237 Note 166 supra.
238 Note 183 supra.
